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Abstract
Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we
study the repeated n-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence
of implementation error with a guarantee that the resulting payoff will be no less than any of the co-players’. By enumerating
strategic possibilities for n = 3, we show that such a strategy indeed exists when its memory length m equals three. It means that a
deterministic strategy can be publicly employed to stabilize cooperation against error with avoiding the risk of being exploited. We
furthermore show that, for general n-person public-goods game, m ≥ n is necessary to satisfy the above criteria.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Public-goods game, Reciprocity
Introduction
Conflicts between individual and collective interests are ob-
served across a variety of fields from genetics to international
politics. For example, genes can inflict damage to other genes
in the same genome for spreading at a higher rate even if it
threatens the ‘host’ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Some microorganisms spend
energy to produce chemicals that are beneficial for the whole
population, which can be exploited by non-cooperating mu-
tants [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The same conflict exists in coopera-
tive mammals when they hunt in group or stand guard against
predators [11, 12, 13]. One of such cooperative species is
Homo sapiens, the political animal [14]. Not surprisingly,
human societies have constantly experienced the Tragedy of
the Commons [15, 16, 17, 18] and struggled to preserve com-
mon goods against it. There are a few conventional ways to
achieve this goal: The first is the ‘Leviathan’ solution involv-
ing governmental regulations [19, 20, 21]. The next is the
market mechanism dealing with the common resource as pri-
vate property [22, 23, 24]. The third one is institutional de-
sign for collective actions of civil society [25] such as punish-
ment [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] combined with a repu-
tation system [35, 36]. However, the above answers are becom-
ing hard to justify on a global scale because there is no world
government [37], market failure is likely to occur [38], and in-
stitutionalism tends to fail for a large group of people [39]. The
question is then what can be done about players that refuse to
contribute.
To give a concrete form to this question, let us consider the n-
person public-goods (PG) game [40, 41, 42, 43]. In our setting,
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each player may either cooperate (c) by contributing a private
token to a public pool or defect (d) by refusing it. The tokens
are then multiplied by a factor ρ and equally distributed to the
players. The multiplication factor ρ must be greater than one
and smaller than the number of players to describe the conflict
between individual and collective interests. A player’s payoff is
then defined as ρncn when the player cooperates (c)1 + ρncn when the player defects (d) , (1)
where nc is the number of cooperators including the focal
player. Everyone prefers d, and zero contribution is a Nash
equilibrium of this one-shot game. In many circumstances,
however, the players are bound to interact repeatedly for a long
time. Under the shadow of the future, it becomes possible to
devise strategies conditioned on previous interactions, whereby
reciprocity [44, 45, 46] comes into play in organizing collective
efforts for the public pool. For example, a generalized version
of tit-for-tat (TFT) forms a Nash equilibrium if error probability
is strictly zero [40, 47] in a noiseless environment [48, 49, 50].
In terms of the repeated PG game, our question is the follow-
ing: What can we advise players of this game in the presence
of implementation error, if they wish to achieve full coopera-
tion without being exploited repeatedly by others? The direct n-
person generalization of TFT cannot be an answer because it re-
sults in a series of wasteful retaliation when someone defects by
mistake. An all-or-none strategy [51], a generalization of win-
stay-lose-shift [52, 53, 54, 55], is a strong candidate for our pur-
pose because it constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation is sufficiently high [56].
Unfortunately, the cost-benefit analysis per se is often a diffi-
cult issue in practice. Another drawback is that this strategy
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Figure 1: (a) Illustration of the three criteria imposed on a strategy Ω. [i]
Efficiency: Mutual cooperation is realized when all players use Ω. [ii] Defensi-
bility: It is guaranteed that a player using Ω never has a lower long-term payoff
than those of the co-players whatever strategies they use. [iii] Distinguishabil-
ity: When the co-players are naive cooperators, a player using Ω has a strictly
higher payoff than the others’. (b) An example of a transition graph. Suppose
that Alice takes d at the state of (cc, cd, cd). There are four next possible states
(cd, dc, dc), (cd, dc, dd), (cd, dd, dc), and (cd, dd, dd) depending on the moves
of Bob and Charlie. In this manner, a memory-2 strategy is represented by a
graph having 26 nodes, each of which has 4 outgoing links.
systematically yields a higher payoff to its co-player who plays
unconditional defection (AllD). Although the idea of the zero-
determinant (ZD) strategies [57, 58, 59, 60] may help to have
control over the situation in the n-person case [61], the proba-
bilistic retaliation prescribed by most ZD strategies can hardly
be an available option when it comes to policymaking [62]. In-
direct reciprocity [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72] is also
difficult to bring into action because it requires an agreement
on every player’s reputation within a time scale of successive
interactions. To sum up, we need a deterministic strategy of
direct reciprocity such that solves the repeated PG game with
an arbitrary multiplication factor ρ ∈ (1, n) and nonzero error
probability e > 0. It is reasonable to say that the players may
safely adopt a certain strategy Ω if it satisfies the following three
criteria [73] (see Fig. 1(a)).
1. Efficiency: Mutual cooperation is achieved with probabil-
ity one as error probability e approaches zero, when all
players use this strategy Ω. Mathematically speaking, we
consider a strategy profile P = {s1, s2, . . . , si, . . . , sn} of n
players, and the relevant observable is player i’s long-term
payoff, defined as
fi ≡ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
F(t)i , (2)
where F(t)i denotes the instantaneous payoff at time t that
player i receives with si. When everyone uses Ω with e >
0, the Markovian dynamics of strategic interaction con-
verges to a unique stationary distribution, from which fi is
readily calculated for a given strategy profile [74, 75]. The
efficiency criterion essentially means that lime→0+ fi = ρ
when P = PΩ ≡ {Ω,Ω, . . . ,Ω}.
2. Defensibility: The strategy Ω ensures that none of the co-
players can obtain higher long-term payoffs against Ω re-
gardless of the co-players’ strategies and initial state when
e = 0. This condition assures lime→0+
(
fi − f j
)
≥ 0, where
si = Ω and j denotes any possible co-player of i. When
combined with efficiency, this criterion is strong enough
for PΩ to be a cooperative Nash equilibrium, in which
lime→0+ fi = ρ for every player i. To verify this state-
ment, suppose that a player, say j, unilaterally switches
to another strategy while the others keep using Ω. Player
j’s resulting long-term payoff is denoted as f ′j , and each of
the other Ω-using players obtains a certain payoff φ, which
may not equal ρ. According to the Pareto optimality of SΩ,
the total payoff of the n players becomes less than or equal
to that of PΩ, i.e., (n− 1)φ+ f ′j ≤ nρ. Defensibility means
that φ ≥ f ′j for j’s every possible choice, which leads to
the conclusion that f ′j ≤ ρ.
3. Distinguishability: If si = Ω and all its co-players are un-
conditional cooperators (AllC), player i can exploit them
to earn a strictly higher long-term payoff than the co-
players’. That is, fi > f j when j is an AllC player. This
may be sharpened further by requiring the same inequal-
ity for every possible number of Ω-players between one
and n − 1, but such refinement turns out to be irrelevant
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in this work. This criterion is introduced to suppress inva-
sion of AllC due to neutral drift [76, 77, 78]. It should be
noted, however, that this criterion does not fully eliminate
the possibility of a second-order drift via a third strategy
between Ω and AllC.
Note the seemingly conflicting requirements expressed in these
criteria: Ω must recover cooperation from erroneous defection
while protecting itself from malicious ones. It is very doubt-
ful that one can tell other players’ intentions, however, espe-
cially when they have longer memories and better computa-
tional power. Worse is that they may even conspire together
to entrap our focal player. The dilemma between efficiency and
defensibility is so severe that one often feels almost forced to
compromise one of them, but we have to ask ourselves whether
they are really mutually exclusive.
In fact, it is known that the criteria can be met in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) game, an equivalent of the two-person
PG game. The resulting strategy is based on TFT but able to
correct the player’s own error [73]. It is tempting to apply this
strategy to the n-person game, e.g., by reducing the situation to
an effective two-person game between one and the other play-
ers. However, this idea does not work when n > 2 for the fol-
lowing reason: Suppose that everyone has adopted the strategy.
When someone made a mistake, the other players will respond
by taking d to defend themselves. Although the first player tries
to redeem the mistake, the point is that the other n − 1 players
see each other choosing d. As long as some other players are
defecting, the strategy will advise against returning to c for the
sake of defensibility, so it fails to reestablish cooperation. This
‘observer’ effect illustrates a fundamental difficulty of the n-
person game when n > 2.
Now, our question on the Tragedy of the Commons boils
down to whether it is possible to meet the three criteria of ef-
ficiency, defensibility, and distinguishability for n > 2. In this
work, we report two findings: First, when the number of players
is n = 3, we can explicitly construct Ω whose memory length
m is three. Second, we show for the general n-person case that
m must be greater than or equal to n for a strategy to satisfy
the efficiency and the defensibility criteria simultaneously. In
other words, the Tragedy of the Commons among three players
can be safely solved for an arbitrary multiplication factor, in the
sense of a cooperative Nash equilibrium, when the error proba-
bility is vanishingly small yet nonzero. At the same time, such
a solution will become more and more intricate as the number
of players increases.
Methods
Let us explain how to check the above criteria in the three-
person PG game by means of direct enumeration. First of all,
we have to define the game. We will denote the three players as
Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively. The payoff matrix from
Alice’s point of view is defined as
M ≡

0 1 2
c ρ 23ρ
1
3ρ
d 1 + 23ρ 1 +
1
3ρ 1
 , (3)
Table 1: Abbreviated notations for states with m = 2. The numbers on the
left column mean how many players defected at t − 2 and t − 1 among Bob and
Charlie, respectively.
Abbreviated Complete notation
(∗∗, 22) (∗∗, dd, dd)
(∗∗, 21) (∗∗, dd, dc) or (∗∗, dc, dd)
(∗∗, 20) (∗∗, dc, dc)
(∗∗, 12) (∗∗, cd, dd) or (∗∗, dd, cd)
(∗∗, 11) (∗∗, cd, dc) or (∗∗, dc, cd)
(∗∗, 11) (∗∗, dd, cc) or (∗∗, cc, dd)
(∗∗, 10) (∗∗, dc, cc) or (∗∗, cc, dc)
(∗∗, 02) (∗∗, cd, cd)
(∗∗, 01) (∗∗, cc, cd) or (∗∗, cd, cc)
(∗∗, 00) (∗∗, cc, cc)
where the column indices represent the number of defectors
among Bob and Charlie. The next step is to choose an appropri-
ate strategy space. It is common to classify strategies according
to their memory length m [79]. For example, if a strategy has
m = 2, it refers to two previous time steps to make a decision
at time t. The players’ memory state in total can be written as
S t = (At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1,Ct−2Ct−1), where At, Bt, and Ct repre-
sent the moves taken from {c, d} by Alice, Bob, and Charlie at
time t, respectively. The number of states is thus 23m = 64,
but the actual number can be reduced to 40 because Alice’s
moves will not be affected even if Bob and Charlie exchange
their names (Table 1). For this reason, the number of possible
strategies for Alice amounts to N(m = 2) = 240 ≈ 1.1 × 1012.
This is an upper bound for direct enumeration because the num-
ber increases to N(m = 3) = 2288 ≈ 5.0 × 1086, which is com-
parable to the estimated number of protons in the universe. For
this reason, we begin by restricting ourselves to m = 2.
We are now ready to deal with the criteria. Suppose that Al-
ice is using a certain strategy, sAlice. Among all the transitions
between every pair of states, only some are allowed by sAlice:
Note that S t+1 = (At−1At, Bt−1Bt,Ct−1Ct) shares At−1, Bt−1, and
Ct−1 with S t. From Alice’s point of view, her strategy Ω has
already determined At from S t, leaving only two unknowns,
Bt and Ct. Therefore, every state can be followed by one of
four possibilities, depending on Bob’s and Charlie’s moves. In
graph-theoretic terms, each state can be mapped to a node so
that every possible transition from S t to S t+1 allowed by her
strategy sAlice is completely specified by a graph of 64 nodes,
each of which has 4 outgoing links as shown in Fig. 1(b). Here-
after, we denote it as the transition graph of the strategy. The
defensibility criterion requires that Alice must not be exploited
repeatedly by any of her co-players. Let us define a loop as
a sequence of consecutive states S t → S t+1 → . . . → S t+ν
with S t = S t+ν. This is an important unit of analysis be-
cause only states on a loop can be visited repeatedly to af-
fect the players’ long-term payoffs. For sAlice to be defensi-
ble, it should satisfy inequalities
∑ν−1
τ=0
[
F(τ)Alice − F(τ)Bob
]
≥ 0 and∑ν−1
τ=0
[
F(τ)Alice − F(τ)Charlie
]
≥ 0 against any finite-memory strategies
j and k, where the payoffs are evaluated along every possible
loop S t → S t+1 → · · · → S t+ν of the transition graph of sAlice.
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In other words, Alice’s strategy must not contain a ‘risky’ loop,
along which the sum of Alice’s payoffs is smaller than that of
either Bob or Charlie. If no risky loop exists in the transition
graph of sAlice, this is a sufficient condition for fAlice ≥ fBob
and fAlice ≥ fCharlie with arbitrary strategies of Bob and Charlie
when e→ 0+ [73]. The existence of risky loops can be investi-
gated by means of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [80].
To reduce the strategy space to search, we first check the de-
fensibility under the assumption that Bob or Charlie always de-
fects (AllD). Then, we can exclude the following states from
consideration, (∗∗, 20), (∗∗, 11), (∗∗, 10), (∗ ∗ 02), (∗∗, 01), and
(∗∗, 00), because these are inconsistent with the assumption.
We are left with 16 states originating from (∗∗, 22), (∗∗, 21),
(∗∗, 12), and (∗∗, 11¯). The number of possible (sub-)strategies
is thus 216 = 65, 536, which is readily tractable. By an exhaus-
tive search for the defensibility, we obtain 48 sub-strategies out
of the 216 possibilities. As a consequence, the number of strate-
gies is reduced to 48×224 = 805, 306, 368. For these remaining
strategies, we comprehensively check the defensibility criterion
by using a supercomputer without the assumption that Bob or
Charlie is an AllD player.
The efficiency and distinguishability criteria can be checked
by calculating fAlice when P = {sAlice, sBob, sCharlie} =
{sAlice, sAlice, sAlice} and {sAlice,AllC,AllC}, respectively. The
long-term payoff fAlice is calculated from the stationary prob-
ability distribution over the states, which can be obtained by
linear algebraic calculation. If sAlice fulfills all these criteria, it
is an Ω strategy, and we will also call it ‘successful’.
Result
Successful strategies for the three-person game
Our first result is impossibility: No memory-2 strategy satis-
fies the efficiency and defensibility criteria together, according
to our direct enumeration of N(m = 2) = 1.1 × 1012 cases. Al-
though 3, 483, 008 strategies have passed the defensibility cri-
terion, none of them satisfies the efficiency criterion. The joint
application of defensibility and efficiency turns out to be too
tough for strategies with m ≤ 2.
However, we have a class of strategies that are partially ef-
ficient. Out of 3, 483, 008 defensible strategies, 544 strategies
show stationary probability ≈ 1/8 at (cc, cc, cc), whereas the
probability is close to zero for the others. We further impose
the distinguishability criterion and obtained 256 strategies that
are defensible, distinguishable, and partially efficient. Each of
them will be called a partially successful strategy (PS2), and
their full list is given in Table 2.
The low efficiency of a PS2 is explained as follows: When
all players adopt a PS2, some states converge to (cc, cc, cc) and
some others to (dd, dd, dd). The respective sets of the states
will be denoted as c- and d-clusters (Fig. 2). We note that the
fully defective state (dd, dd, dd) is robust against one-bit error
because (dc, dd, dd), (dd, dc, dd), and (dd, dd, dc) belong to the
d-cluster. It is actually a necessary condition to be defensible
against AllD: A player must defect when one of the co-players
keeps defecting. Suppose that they are trapped in the fully de-
fective state. Even if Charlie cooperates by mistake, Alice and
Bob have no chance to change their moves because these two
cannot distinguish each other from an AllD player. When the
same argument applies to the n-person game, the fully defective
state must be robust against (n − 2)-bit error. To escape from
(dd, dd, dd), two players, say Bob and Charlie, have to make
error at the same time. Then, Alice may turn to cooperation at a
subsequent round. As a consequence, the probability to escape
from the d-cluster, denoted as P(d)esc, is of O(e2) for n = 3. If
we look at the probability of escaping from the c-cluster, P(c)esc,
it also turns out to be of O(e2). Because the escape probabil-
ities have the same order of magnitude, the system can transit
back and forth between the c- and d-clusters, so that the clusters
occupy similar amounts of stationary probabilities even in the
limit of e→ 0. This is the reason that the stationary probability
of (cc, cc, cc) is significantly less than 100%.
To make the strategy efficient, the c-cluster must be robust
against any two-bit error, i.e., yielding P(c)esc ∼ O(e3). Our find-
ing is that it is possible to design successful strategies by mak-
ing the memory length longer and overriding some of the moves
prescribed by the PS2. We have enumerated all possible occur-
rences of two-bit errors and introduced moves to correct these
errors as shown in Table 3. In Fig. 3, we depict paths due to
two-bit flip errors with brown arrows. To recover mutual co-
operation, we add recovery paths as indicated by the green ar-
rows. The strategy goes as follows: (i) Each player will usually
follow one of the PS2’s. (ii) If the memory of three consecu-
tive states shows unusual transition such as represented by the
brown arrows, the players will activate “Plan B” to follow the
green arrows. In other words, we override the moves in Ta-
ble 3, whereby the memory-2 PS2’s are extended to memory-
3 successful strategies. We have confirmed that the stationary
probability of the fully cooperative state (ccc, ccc, ccc) indeed
approaches one as e → 0 without violating the defensibility
and distinguishability criteria. It is thus concluded that at least
256 successful strategies do exist for the three-person PG game
when memory length is three. One of the successful memory-3
strategies thereby obtained is shown in Table 4.
Necessary memory length for the n-person game
Generalizing the above impossibility result, we can show that
m ≥ n is required for a strategy to be successful for the n-
players PG game when n ≥ 3. We have already seen that the
fully defective state must be robust against (n−2)-bit error to be
defensible against AllD, which means that P(d)esc . O(en−1). On
the other hand, the efficiency criterion requires that P(c)esc/P
(d)
esc →
0 as e → 0. In other words, we need P(c)esc . O(en), which im-
plies that the fully cooperative state has to be robust against
(n− 1)-bit error. We note the following: If the fully cooperative
state of a memory-m strategy is robust against k-bit error, its
memory length m must be greater than k for this strategy to be
defensible. A rigorous proof for this statement is given in the
next paragraph, but a rough explanation goes as follows: Sup-
pose that k-bit error happened to a player, say Bob, so that he
took the opposite moves k times in a row by mistake. He must
have m = k + 1 at least to realize and correct his own mistakes.
Otherwise, he could not tell if he has committed the errors. In
our case, k equals n − 1 in the n-person PG game, which leads
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Table 2: Partially successful strategies with m = 2. For five different states, the moves are indicated by ∗, which means that they can be arbitrarily chosen from
{c, d}. Some other states have multiple At’s, which may be denoted as [A(1)t A(2)t . . . A(8)t ]. One must choose moves with the same upper index at these states, so they
give 8 possibilities. The total number of strategies covered here is thus 25 × 8 = 256. Every third column shows which rule explains the move (see Section 4).
State At Rule State At Rule State At Rule State At Rule
(cc, 00) c i (cd, 00) c ii (dc, 00) d ii (dd, 00) c vi
(cc, 01) d (cd, 01) ∗ (dc, 01) [ddcdcdcd] (dd, 01) ∗
(cc, 02) d (cd, 02) [ddccdddd] (dc, 02) c iii (dd, 02) d
(cc, 10) [cdccccdd] i (cd, 10) d (dc, 10) c i (dd, 10) d
(cc, 11) d (cd, 11) c iv (dc, 11) d (dd, 11) ∗
(cc, 11) d (cd, 11) d (dc, 11) d (dd, 11) d
(cc, 12) [ccdddddd] (cd, 12) d (dc, 12) d (dd, 12) d
(cc, 20) c i (cd, 20) d (dc, 20) ∗ i (dd, 20) d
(cc, 21) d (cd, 21) d (dc, 21) c v (dd, 21) d
(cc, 22) d (cd, 22) d (dc, 22) ∗ (dd, 22) d
0 cc,cc,cc
34 dc,cc,dc
25 cd,dc,cd
12 cc,dd,cc
46 dc,dd,dc
4 cc,cd,cc
40 dc,dc,cc
22 cd,cd,dc
3 cc,cc,dd
43 dc,dc,dd
1 cc,cc,cd
10 cc,dc,dc
37 dc,cd,cd
48 dd,cc,cc 58 dd,dc,dc
16 cd,cc,cc
63 dd,dd,dd
23 cd,cd,dd
41 dc,dc,cd
35 dc,cc,dd
11 cc,dc,dd
29 cd,dd,cd
44 dc,dd,cc
14 cc,cd,dc38 dc,cd,dc
53 dd,cd,cd50 dd,cc,dc 26 cd,dc,dc
56 dd,dc,cc
31 cd,dd,dd
15 cc,dd,dd
5 cc,cd,cd
17 cd,cc,cd
20 cd,cd,cc
47 dc,dd,dd59 dd,dc,dd
62 dd,dd,dc
61 dd,dd,cd
60 dd,dd,cc
55 dd,cd,dd
51 dd,cc,dd
Figure 2: Common subgraph of the 256 partially successful strategies with m = 2, when all three players adopt the same strategy. The label of each node indicates
the state in the form of At−2At−1, Bt−2Bt−1,Ct−2Ct−1 prefixed by an index ranging from 0 to 63. The connected components including the fully cooperative state
(cc, cc, cc) and the fully defective state (dd, dd, dd) are depicted by light-blue and orange boxes, respectively. Some nodes have double dotted links instead of a
single solid link, indicating that the outgoing link depends on which strategy to choose among the 256 strategies.
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24 cd,dc,cc
B
B&C
B
C
B
C
B C
0 cc,cc,cc
34 dc,cc,dc
25 cd,dc,cd
12 cc,dd,cc
46 dc,dd,dc
4 cc,cd,cc
40 dc,dc,cc
22 cd,cd,dc
3 cc,cc,dd
43 dc,dc,dd
1 cc,cc,cd
10 cc,dc,dc
37 dc,cd,cd
48 dd,cc,cc 58 dd,dc,dc
16 cd,cc,cc
63 dd,dd,dd
23 cd,cd,dd
41 dc,dc,cd
35 dc,cc,dd
11 cc,dc,dd
29 cd,dd,cd
44 dc,dd,cc
14 cc,cd,dc38 dc,cd,dc
53 dd,cd,cd50 dd,cc,dc 26 cd,dc,dc
56 dd,dc,cc
31 cd,dd,dd
15 cc,dd,dd
5 cc,cd,cd
17 cd,cc,cd
20 cd,cd,cc
47 dc,dd,dd59 dd,dc,dd
62 dd,dd,dc
61 dd,dd,cd
60 dd,dd,cc
55 dd,cd,dd
51 dd,cc,dd
Figure 3: Modified subgraphs with m = 3. The paths along which the states change by one- or two-bit error are depicted by brown arrows. Only Bob’s and Charlie’s
implementation errors are drawn because we have to consider errors up to O(e2) and the graph is symmetric with respect to Alice, Bob and Charlie. Characters “B”
and “C” shown on these arrows indicate whose move was altered by the error. There are five possible paths to go outside of the connected component: (0 → 5),
(4 → 29), (4 → 24), (25 → 38), and (25 → 35). The green paths are introduced for m = 3 successful strategies to recover from these noise. These paths are
taken only when the state changes according to the brown arrows in previous rounds. For instance, the move at node 38 is usually d but it becomes c only when the
previous node was 25. By introducing green arrows, the state returns to the fully cooperative node.
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Table 3: Moves added to partially successful strategies to make them
satisfy the efficiency condition. The states with m = 3 are denoted as
(At−3At−2At−1, Bt−3Bt−2Bt−1,Ct−3Ct−2Ct−1). Alice must choose c at these
states.
State At State At
(ccd, ccd, ccc) c (cdc, ccd, ccc) c
(ccd, ccc, ccd) c (cdc, ccc, ccd) c
(cdc, cdc, ccd) c (ccc, cdc, ccd) c
(cdc, ccd, cdc) c (ccc, ccd, cdc) c
(cdd, ccd, ccd) c (dcd, cdc, cdc) c
(ddc, cdd, cdd) c (cdd, dcc, cdc) c
(cdd, ddc, cdd) c (cdd, cdc, dcc) c
(cdd, cdd, ddc) c
Figure 4: (a) Basic notations. We assume that strategy S recovers cooperation
from k successive errors when all three players have adopted it. All the players
were cooperating at t < 0. For 1 ≤ t ≤ k, Alice has at most k sequential errors.
By assumption, S is robust against k-bit error, so all the players must recover
full cooperation at a certain time step, trec. The sequences of Alice and the
others are denoted as Γ and ∆, respectively. (b) Breaking the defensibility of S .
The group of A’s co-players, denoted as A¯, start defecting and then simulate a
proper move sequence to recover full cooperation.
A¯
A
· · ·
· · · · · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
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to the inequality m ≥ n. In what follows, we will show that a
memory-k strategy cannot satisfy the defensibility criterion if it
makes the fully cooperative state robust against k-bit error. The
proof consists of two steps:
First, suppose that there exists a memory-k defensible strat-
egy S whose fully cooperative state is robust against k-bit error.
We begin by assuming that the players are in the fully coop-
erative state with a strategy profile P = {S , S , . . . , S }. If error
occurs at t = 1 and may also have occurred for 2 ≤ t ≤ k
only on the moves of Alice (denoted by A), the fully coopera-
tive state is recovered in a finite time step t = trec(> k). This
is because the fully cooperative state of the strategy S is as-
sumed to be robust against k-bit error and the total number of
errors is less than or equal to k. Depending on how error oc-
curs for 2 ≤ t ≤ k, the sequences of moves taken by A for this
period can be arbitrary, so the number of possible patterns is
2k−1. Each of these sequence of Alice’s moves will be denoted
by Γi, where i = 1 . . . 2k−1. The move at t in Γi is denoted by Γti,
which is either c or d. On the other hand, we suppose that no
error occurs on the other players (denoted by A¯ as a collective
entity), so A¯ shows an identical sequence of moves, following
S . The sequence of moves by A¯ for the noise pattern i is de-
noted by ∆i and its move at t is denoted by ∆ti (Fig. 4(a)). It is
important that ∆ti actually depends only on A’s previous moves
Γ1i , . . . ,Γ
t−1
i because the moves of A¯ are deterministic. Let P(Γi)
and P(∆i) denote the payoff of A and A¯ for 1 ≤ t ≤ trec, respec-
tively. According to the defensibility of A¯’s strategy S , we have
an inequality P(Γi) ≤ P(∆i), whereas P(Γi) ≥ P(∆i) is not nec-
essarily true because A made errors in following the strategy
S .
Second, we consider the case where A follows the strategy S
but the other players in A¯ make an alliance and move together
(Fig. 4(b)). We will show that A¯ can repeatedly exploit A by
choosing their moves as follows.
1. Start from full cooperation.
2. A¯ defects first, while A is cooperating.
3. A¯ continues defecting until they reach full defection. A
must eventually defect, otherwise she is exploited. At this
stage, A¯ has a higher net payoff than A’s because they
started defection earlier than A.
4. At a certain point, say t = 1, A¯ returns to c. A is still de-
fecting to defend herself, so we observe (Γ1i ,∆
1
i ) = (d, c).
5. A¯ then takes ∆2i of Fig. 4(a). Note that ∆
2
i is independent
of i because it only depends on Γ1i and ∆
1
i , which are fixed
as d and c, respectively. On the other hand, A’s move, Γ2i ,
may be either c or d, depending on S .
6. Find a sequence i for which Γ2i equals A’s previous move.
A¯ then takes ∆3i , which is identical for any ∆i as long as Γ
2
i
is the same. Once again, A’s move, Γ3i , may be either c or
d.
7. Repeat the above sequence until A¯ takes ∆treci . In short, A¯ is
simulating one of ∆i’s to recover full cooperation. Which
∆i to choose depends on S , but there is always one noise
pattern that produces such Γi and ∆i. After this series of
moves, they eventually get back to full cooperation.
In addition to the payoff advantage in step 3, A¯’s net payoff
from step 4 to 7 is always higher than or equal to A’s because
P(∆i) ≥ P(Γi) for any i. In this way, A¯ can repeatedly ex-
ploit A, which contradicts our assumption that S is defensible.
Hence, there is no memory-k strategy S that is defensible and
robust against k-bit error. For this reason, if the fully coopera-
tive state of a memory-m strategy is robust against k-bit error,
its memory length m must be greater than k for this strategy
to be defensible. If Alice’s memory length is longer than k,
on the other hand, the state from Alice’s point of view will be
(d,Γ1i ,Γ
2
i , . . . ,Γ
k
i , d,∆
1
i ,∆
2
i , . . . ,∆
k
i ). She can thus recognize that
the state started from full defection and that Bob and Charlie
initiated the change. In this case, Alice can defend herself by
keeping d.
Discussion
In summary, we have found that three players can safely
maintain full cooperation in the PG game in a noisy environ-
ment with e→ 0+. From Tables 2 and 3, we see that a success-
ful strategy Ω is conditioned by the following rules.
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Table 4: One of successful memory-3 strategies. We have picked up the strategy having the largest number of c. The left column shows the state of Bob and Charlie,
whereas Alice’s state is shown on the right.
At−3At−2At−1
Bt−3Bt−2Bt−1Ct−3Ct−2Ct−1 ccc ccd cdc cdd dcc dcd ddc ddd
cccccc c c d c c c d c
cccccd / ccdccc d c c c d c c c
ccccdc / cdcccc c d c d c d c d
ccccdd / cddccc d d d d d d d d
cccdcc / dccccc c c d c c c d c
cccdcd / dcdccc d c c c d c c c
cccddc / ddcccc c d c d c d c d
cccddd / dddccc d d d d d d d d
ccdccd d c c c d c c d
ccdcdc / cdcccd c c c c d c d c
ccdcdd / cddccd d d d d d d d d
ccddcc / dccccd d c c c d c c c
ccddcd / dcdccd d c c d d c c d
ccdddc / ddcccd d c d c d c d c
ccdddd / dddccd d d d d d d d d
cdccdc c d c d c c c d
cdccdd / cddcdc d d c d d d c d
cdcdcc / dcccdc c d c c c d c d
cdcdcd / dcdcdc d c d c d c d c
cdcddc / ddccdc c d c d c d c d
cdcddd / dddcdc d d c d d d c d
cddcdd d d c d d d c d
cdddcc / dcccdd d d d d d d d d
cdddcd / dcdcdd d d d d d d d d
cddddc / ddccdd d d c c d d c d
cddddd / dddcdd d d c d d d c d
dccdcc c c d c c c d c
dccdcd / dcddcc d c c c d c c c
dccddc / ddcdcc c d c d c d c d
dccddd / ddddcc d d d d d d d d
dcddcd d c c d d c c d
dcdddc / ddcdcd d c d c d c d c
dcdddd / ddddcd d d d d d d d d
ddcddc c d c d c d c d
ddcddd / dddddc d d c d d d c d
dddddd d d c d d d c d
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1. Preserve cooperation. If everyone cooperated last time,
Alice chooses c according to Ω. In other words, c is
the choice at (∗c, ∗0), such as (cc, 00), (cc, 10), (cc, 20),
(dc, 10), and (dc, 20) (see Table 1 for the abbreviated no-
tations).
2. Challenge the co-players’ naivety. An exception of the first
rule is (dc, 00), at which d is prescribed because of the dis-
tinguishability criterion. Due to this prescription, if Bob
and Charlie are AllC, they are exploited by Alice who al-
ternates between (dc, 00) and (cd, 00). This explains why
Alice cooperates at (cd, 00).
3. Retreat if the co-players are not naive. If Bob and Charlie
are not AllC, on the other hand, they will choose d in re-
sponse to Alice’s unilateral defection, so the resulting state
will be (dc, 02) instead of (dc, 00). If this is the case, Alice
cooperates to avoid TFT retaliation.
4. Forgive after responding to provocation. Note that (dc, 02)
corresponds to (dc, cd, cd), which Bob or Charlie would
interpret as (cd, 11). The strategy prescribes c at (cd, 11)
so that full cooperation is recovered quickly when Bob and
Charlie also use Ω.
5. Grab the chance to cooperate. If the state was initially full
defection, it is definitely safe to defect, so (dc, 21) is ac-
cessed by two simultaneous mistakes of Alice and another
player with probability of O(e2). As a result, (dc, dc, dd)
and its permutations form the outermost periphery of the
c-cluster in Fig. 2. If Alice reaches (dc, 21) by chance, she
chooses c once again to establish full cooperation.
6. Don’t be evil. If everyone uses Ω, (dc, 21) such as
(dc, dc, dd) is followed by (cc, cc, dd), which is (dd, 00)
from Charlie’s viewpoint. He has been the only defector
for two rounds, but he is now supposed to contribute to the
public pool. If the co-players are using Ω, they will pun-
ish Charlie’s successive defection, which leads the state to
(dc, 02) that we have already examined at the third rule.
The above six rules explain the basic behavior of a PS2 (Ta-
ble 2). To make it fully efficient, we have to add one more rule:
7. Look at the context. With referring to the memory of
t − 3, one must override some moves of a PS2 as listed
in Table 3. The basic recipe is that Alice has to cooper-
ate in the subsequent two rounds if she defected by mis-
take. In addition, the transition from state (dd, dc, dd) to
(dc, cc, dc) must also be allowed if the former one is a part
of (cdd, ddc, cdd).
We believe that most of these patterns can be extended to
n > 3 in principle, although we have not completed the search
for a successful strategy in these cases yet. Obviously, the nec-
essary condition of m ≥ n means that the strategy space expands
super-exponentially: The number of strategies for the n-person
game with memory length n is 22
n2
, which is far beyond our
computational feasibility if we are to enumerate these strate-
gies comprehensively. A possible alternative could be to build
a strategy based on a successful strategy of the (n − 1)-person
game. We are currently working on the four-person game based
on a successful strategy for n = 3. Since a successful strategy
for n = 3 has the c-cluster robust against two-bit error, we will
be able to construct a PS2 for n = 4 based on them, whose c-
and d-clusters are two-bit error tolerant. We expect that a PS2
can be elevated to successful strategies by extending the mem-
ory length and overriding some of the moves just as we did for
n = 3. If this attempt succeeds, it will then be possible to apply
this procedure iteratively to solve the general n-person game.
Similarly to the ZD strategies, our successful strategies are
capable to give the player control over the payoff differences
relative to the co-players’. A nontrivial aspect of our find-
ing is that one may publicly announce his or her determinis-
tic strategy, making the future moves predictable by the co-
players. By analyzing the announced strategy, the co-players
understand that it is impossible to exploit the focal player. With
the knowledge of the focal player’s strategy, the co-players may
also safely adopt the same one to enjoy the above properties,
by which a cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached. In an ac-
tual human population, of course, it would be fair to say that
the performance generally depends on the learning dynamics as
well as the interaction structure [81, 82], and the precise un-
derstanding of their interplay will pose an interesting research
question. From a biological point of view, one could also ask if
our computational solution is accessible by means of a certain
form of evolutionary dynamics. We believe that it is possible
in principle, but it could take an exceedingly long time because
the number of strategic possibilities is literally astronomical.
As the number of players increases, most of the prescriptions
of successful strategies will appear cryptic unless one looks at
the whole connection structure of states, just as c sometimes
turns out to be the correct choice for Alice at (dc, 22) (Table 3).
It suggests that our moral instinct, which has been shaped by
evolution, might fail to guide us in dealing with the immense
complexity of the game. The important point is that we can
nevertheless induce mutual cooperation by advising the players
to adopt this strategy, in the light of its efficiency, defensibility,
and distinguishability.
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